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Growing evidence indicates that the diffusion of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can substantially alter the contours of collective violence in developing 
nations.  However, empirical investigations of such effects have generally been hampered by 
an inability to systematically measure geographic variation in ICT penetration, across 
multiple technologies and multiple countries.  In this paper, I show that geo-referenced 
household surveys can be used to estimate sub-national differences in the spatial reach of 
radio and cellular communications infrastructures in 24 African states.  By combining these 
estimates with geo-referenced measures of the location of disaggregated events of collective 
violence, I show that there are important differences between centralized ‘mass’ 
communication technologies – such as radios – that foster vertical linkages between state and 
society, and decentralized ‘social’ communication technologies – such as cell phones – that 
foster horizontal linkages between the members of a society.  The evidence demonstrates that 
the geographic reach of mass media penetration generates substantial pacifying effects, while 
the reach of social media penetration generates substantial increases in collective violence, 
especially in areas lacking access to mass media infrastructure.  I argue that these findings are 
consistent with a theory of ICT effects which focuses on the strengthening and weakening of 
economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas. 
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Introduction 
 State influence, and the difficulties associated with extending such influence over 
space, have long been noted as central forces underlying the geography of  collective peace 
and collective violence.  Drawing on this insight, a wide array of studies have sought to 
develop more rigorous approaches to the measurement of state capacity as a means of 
enhancing our understanding of the complex mobilizational dynamics underlying the 
emergence of civil conflict (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
Gleditsch, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fjelde & de Soysa, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Lacina, 
2006; Thies, 2010; Sobek, 2010).  Moreover, recent quantitative work has highlighted the 
importance of ‘soft power’ mechanisms, rooted in the spread of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), as central to both the production and disruption of 
domestic stability (Baillard, 2015; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013; Shaprio & Weidmann, 
2012; Warren, 2014; Weidmann, 2015).  However, the limitations of data availability have 
generally forced such studies to focus their attention either on a single technology or a  single 
country, or to rely on national aggregates that ignore within-country variation in the reach of 
communication infrastructures. 
 In contrast, the approach presented here makes possible the systematic examination of 
geographic variation in the reach of ICT networks, in a manner which facilitates comparisons 
within countries, across countries, and across technologies.  The approach is based on the use 
of geo-coded household surveys, which record ownership of multiple kinds of media 
reception devices, in particular: radios and cell phones.   Using spatially-explicit interpolation 
techniques to adjust for the uneven spacing of the survey locations, I show that it is possible 
to estimate local differences in the spatial reach of  ICT infrastructures across 24 African 
states.  Combining these estimates with geo-referenced measures of the location of 
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disaggregated events of armed collective violence, I seek to show that patterns of political 
violence are strongly conditioned by the spatial reach of technologies of communication. 
In doing so, I seek also to provide evidence of the important differences in effects 
between different forms of communication technology.  Extending the theoretical account 
presented in previous work (Warren, 2014), I argue that we can make sense of these 
differences by focusing on whether a given technological form generates a strengthening or 
weakening of economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas.  Whereas ‘mass’ 
communication technologies, such as radio, have been observed to foster vertical linkages 
between state and society, by increasing the ease with which centralized authorities can 
broadly disseminate symbolic appeals to national unity, decentralized ‘social’ communication 
technologies, such as cell phones, instead foster horizontal flows of information between the 
members of a society.  Because such linkages tend to form along socially segregated lines, 
these technologies may therefore serve to heighten, rather than suppress, the ease with which 
social divisions can be promoted and exploited.  This account also implies that the processes 
through which such effects arise may be subject to a substantial degree of path dependence.  
African states are characterized by diverse historical legacies, and the contemporary arrival of 
social communication technologies may carry very different implications in areas previously 
untouched by mass communication technologies.   
 The empirical results presented below utilize the enormous diversity of state-making 
projects across continental Africa to provide new evidence in support of this general 
theoretical account.  Estimating covariate effects through the application of spatial point-
process models – which flexibly account for the spatial interdependence between violent 
event locations without relying on pre-specified spatial units of analysis – the results show 
that the geographic reach of mass media penetration generates substantial pacifying effects, 
reducing the occurrence of collective violence events across a broad sample of African states.  
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In contrast, the results show that the reach of social media penetration generates substantial 
increases in collective violence.  Moreover, the results show that this increase is especially 
pronounced in areas that experience the introduction of social communication technology 
without the prior stabilizing influence of  mass communication technology.  In addition, 
using the same techniques I show that these results are robust to controls for elevation, 
electrification, population density, local wealth, urbanization, prior violence, and state-level 
fixed effects, and thus cannot be easily attributed to the aggregate effects of economic 
development, modernization, or coercive state capacities.  Finally, using longitudinal surveys 
to capture variation over time in the spread of ICTs in Uganda, I show that these results are 
not likely to have been driven by reverse causation, as there is no evidence that ICT 
expansion was conditioned by the location of previous violent events.  Taken as a whole, this 
evidence thus provides strong support for the claim that the geography of collective violence 
is powerfully influenced by the geography of collective ideas. 
 
The geography of state power 
 Approaches to defining and measuring the concept of state capacity have varied 
widely in the existing literature (Benson & Kugler, 1998; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Gleditsch, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fjelde & de Soysa, 2009; 
Hendrix, 2010; Lacina, 2006; Nye 2004; Thies, 2010; Sobek, 2010).  Early treatments tended 
to rely on measures of economic development (i.e. GDP per capita) measured at the level of 
national aggregates, either as a measure of economic competition for the labor of rebel 
recruits (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), or as a proxy of the state’s capacity to  project coercive 
force (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  Some more recent efforts have sought to expand this 
conceptualization of state power, by pointing to the importance of non-material elements of 
state strength, derived from the ‘soft power’ of symbolic appeals to state legitimacy 
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(Cederman, Warren & Sornette, 2011; Warren, 2014).  However, these works have generally 
relied on nationally aggregated measurements, and have therefore been unable to consider the 
effects of geographic variation in state reach within countries.  
 In contrast, the trend in recent quantitative work in the civil conflict literature has 
been towards greater disaggregation of both the independent and dependent variables. Such 
studies have substantially deepened the statistical analysis of civil conflict by replacing 
country-years with units of analysis defined by individual groups, center-periphery dyads, 
gridded cells, group settlement areas, and other sub-national geographic units (e.g. 
Cederman, Girardin & Gleditsch, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann, 2011; 
Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Hegre, Østby 
& Raleigh, 2009; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Urdal, 2008; Weidmann, 2009; Wimmer & Min, 
2006).  These approaches have made possible the investigation of state power on a number of 
dimensions that were previously impermeable to direct observation, while also highlighting 
the crucial importance of sub-national variation in the geography of state penetration.  In 
particular, Shapiro and Weidmann (2014) have pioneered the examination of the security 
implications of geographic variation in communication infrastructure, by showing that the 
locations of violent events in Iraq were conditioned by the spread of cell phone towers over 
time.  Along similar lines, Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) utilize geographic variation in 
cell phone coverage to predict the location of violent events in Africa.  Interestingly, while 
both works argue that the effects of cell phones result from a reduction in the ‘transaction 
costs’ of communication, Shapiro and Weidmann (2014) find cellular coverage to be 
associated with reduced violence, whereas Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) find that cellular 
coverage is associated with increases in violence. 
 While such approaches have greatly advanced our empirical understanding of the 
relationship between communication technologies and political violence, they have also been 
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subject to several important limitations, which may partially explain the apparent 
inconsistencies in their findings.  First, the difficulties involved in directly measuring ICT 
penetration have generally forced existing studies to examine a single technology in isolation, 
making it impossible to systematically examine differences across technological forms, or 
interactions between them.  Second, current approaches have been subject to an important 
statistical limitation: in order to estimate the parameters of a spatial regression, they have 
generally been forced to rely on pre-specified geographic units of analysis, such as grid cells, 
group settlement polygons, or political districts.  This necessarily raises the concern of 
whether different empirical inferences would have been made, if the analysis had been 
premised on alternative geographic units of analysis.  This issue, well-known amongst 
geographers as the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), can generate severe statistical 
biases, with widely varying directions and intensities, rendering multivariate spatial 
regression estimates inherently unreliable (Openshaw, 1984; Fotheringham & Wong, 1991).    
 In the sections that follow, I demonstrate an alternative approach which captures 
multivariate spatial effects without reliance on arbitrary spatial units, by using spatially-
explicit interpolation (i.e. 'kriging') to characterize survey-derived independent variables as 
continuous spatial surfaces, and then using point-process models to simulate the emergence 
of point-like events in this continuous space.   In addition to avoiding the statistical biases 
generated by arbitrary geographic units, I show that this approach also provides a rigorous 
means of directly comparing and contrasting the impacts of different forms of ICT 
penetration on the generation of collective violence, while controlling for the broader effects 
of modernization and development.   
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Technology, capacity, and the marketplace of ideas 
 State capacity, as I use the term here, can be defined as a state’s ability to both project 
coercive force where needed in order to ensure the security of its citizens, while at the same 
time generating sufficient collective attachments so as to render internal coercion largely 
unnecessary.  As Wintrobe (1998) argues, state power exists at the intersection of ‘loyalty’ 
and ‘repression.’  Different theories of state strength have emphasized these two dimensions 
to different degrees.  Some theorists focus on the coercive instruments of surveillance, 
deterrence, and outright force in the development of effective state institutions (Herbst, 2000; 
Tilly, 1992).  Others emphasize the use of public goods to gain support from politically 
relevant communities (Azam, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi & Przeworski, 
2006; Berman, Shapiro & Felter, 2011) or the broader development of sympathies and 
attachments that lead citizens to willingly sacrifice for an imagined ‘nation’ (Anderson, 1991; 
Gellner,1983; Levi, 1988, 2006). 
It is important to remember that, underlying each of these processes, there is 
frequently substantial resistance against state encroachment on the part of peripheral 
populations (Scott, 2009).  A as a result, state capacity is never a static quantity, but rather a 
continual process of state-making.  Moreover, substantial evidence exists that this process of 
state-making has been powerfully constrained by the forces of geography (Buhaug, 2010; 
Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; Buhaug &Rød, 2006; Lemke, 1995; 
Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Weidmann, 2009).  As Boulding (1962) recognized, state power 
must extend itself over physical space and is therefore subject to a ‘loss of strength gradient’ 
in which capacity degrades as a function of distance.  Importantly, the cost of such efforts is 
not simply a function of physical distance, but rather a function of the cost of projecting 
influence, which can be powerfully constrained by the geography of both physical and social 
barriers (see Wood 2008).   
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Of course, such constraints are also rarely static.  The arrival of new technologies and 
capacities, ranging from roads and electrification, to mass communication infrastructure, 
have repeatedly allowed states to extend their abilities to provide goods and project influence 
in previously remote locations.  In the contemporary world, we find a whole spectrum of 
states at different stages in this process.  In some states, all areas are fully incorporated into 
the state-making project and respect the legitimacy of state dictates, while others find 
themselves in the midst of incomplete projects of nation-state creation.  Studying within-
country variation in state penetration is therefore especially important in weak and 
developing states, which are often characterized by an uneven extension of national 
attachments (Kalyvas, 2006), and which because of their inability to pacify all, are forced to 
integrate some while ostracizing others (Wimmer, 2002).  Indeed, this tension at the heart of 
nation-state creation has driven much of the conflict dynamics of the post-Cold War world 
(Wimmer & Min, 2006).   
In such contexts, the generation and suppression of collective violence is far more 
complex than the mere application of military force, revolving around the extension of 
integrative identities as much as the extension of coercive capacities.  Seen from this 
perspective, political violence and political communication are intimately linked, as the idea 
of collective violence must always be communicated before it can be enacted.  The 
production of synchronized killing is necessarily preceded by the production of enemies, and 
the successful dissemination of the idea that killing ‘them’ is just.  Moreover, given the 
multisided nature of most political arenas, success in this pursuit generally also requires the 
defeat of political rivals who would challenge the legitimacy of such divisions through the 
promotion countervailing notions of state loyalty and national unity (Smith , 2003).  The 
dynamics thus pivot on the question of which side will come to dominate this ideational 
contest.   
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While the dynamics surrounding such competition are complex, both qualitative 
historical studies and contemporary statistical studies converge in finding that the forces 
underlying this process of nation-state construction have been powerfully impacted by the 
arrival of technologies of mass communication (Anderson, 1991; Deutsch, 1953; Warren, 
2014).  Of course, the increased communicative power generated by such technologies can be 
used as a means to a wide range of ends.  For instance, radio broadcasts by Hutu extremists 
were found to have accelerated the production of violence during the Rwandan genocide 
(Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014),
1
 but radio broadcasts of reconciliation narratives were shown to 
increase perceptions of social norms of empathy and cooperation between ethnic 
communities in the post-conflict environment (Paluck, 2009).  Such observations imply that 
the aggregate effects of the introduction of new communication technologies will hinge 
crucially on which forms of political communication are most powerfully facilitated through 
their arrival.  
Hence, while communication technologies are always subject to a wide range of 
potential uses, I have argued that we can best understand their aggregate impacts on the 
production of collective violence by considering their capacity to  systematically alter the 
incentives facing competing producers of political ideas (Warren, 2014).  The key factor in 
this account is the scale at which communication is facilitated.  Technological forces which 
facilitate segregated appeals to narrowly constituted audiences can be expected to ease the 
production divisive identities and hence the generation of collective violence, whereas 
technological forces which facilitate broad appeals to national audiences can be expected to 
ease the production of integrative identities and thus render the generation of collective 
violence more difficult.  In other words, we should expect that the aggregate impact of ICT 
                                                 
1 Along similar lines, see Adena et al..(2013) for a discussion of the use of radio to deploy divisive appeals in Nazi Germany, but see also 
Kern & Hainmueller (2009) for evidence of the stabilizing effect of foreign broadcasts in East Germany. 
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penetration will depend on whether a given technological form generates a strengthening or 
weakening of economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas.   
This further implies that different forms of ICT penetration should have quite 
different effects on the production of collective violence.  ‘Mass’ communication 
technologies – such as radio broadcast towers – are characterized by one-to-many network 
structures, and therefore tend to facilitate lines of communication which cross-cut existing 
social cleavages, especially as the increasing density of receivers brings accessibility to 
greater proportions of the population (Briggs & Burke, 2002).  In addition, such systems 
force messages to be transmitted and received publicly, generating broad awareness of 
experiences and perspectives shared by many others in the same society.  Such technologies 
thus increase the relative ease with which centralized authorities can disseminate broad 
symbolic appeals for state loyalty and national unity, and can therefore be expected to foster 
vertical linkages between state and society,  
In contrast, ‘social’ communication technologies – such as cell phones – are 
characterized by many-to-many network structures composed of horizontal linkages between 
individuals,
2
 and therefore tend to facilitate lines of communication which flow along 
political and social divisions, rather than across them.  Studies of cellular communication 
patterns have shown that while such technologies dramatically reduce the costs of long 
distance communication between individuals, the resulting connections nevertheless tend to 
be strongly segregated along existing sociodemographic cleavages, showing the same 
tendencies towards clustering and homophily long observed in other forms of interpersonal 
communication (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Blumenstock & Fratamico, 2013; 
Kovanen et al., 2013).  Moreover, because messages sent through social communication 
technologies can easily be directed to specific individuals, who can receive them in private, 
                                                 
2 For an optimistic view of the social consequences of this increase in horizontal connectivity, see Shirky (2008).  
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such technological forms tend to incentivize the production and dissemination of divisive, 
sectarian appeals which resonate strongly only with the members of narrow sub-
communities.   
Thus, while mass communication technologies have been observed to generate an 
increase in the strength of economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas (Anderson, 1991; 
Deutsch, 1953; Warren, 2014), social communication technologies should instead be 
expected to heighten the relevance of socially-segregated flows of information, thereby 
decreasing the strength of economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas.
3
  In other words, 
whereas mass communication technologies have generally represented powerful forces for 
the centralization of state authority and national unity, social media technologies may instead 
serve to incentivize the promotion of the kinds of narrowly construed sectarian appeals and 
extremist ideologies which ultimately render collective violence imaginable and feasible 
(Brass, 1997; Des Forges, 1999; Tambiah, 1997; Thompson, 1999).  If this is correct, then we 
should expect that the spatial reach of mass communication infrastructure will be associated 
with the successful extension of state influence and a corresponding reduction in the locally 
observed frequency of events of collective violence.  In contrast, we should expect that the 
spatial reach of social communication infrastructure will be associated with greater 
difficulties in the extension of state influence and a corresponding increase in the locally 
observed frequency of events of collective violence.   
 Thus we have the following main hypotheses: 
 
H1.  Ceteris paribus, geographic regions with greater penetration of radio transmission 
capabilities will experience lower rates of collective violence.   
 
                                                 
3 See Snyder (2000) for an insightful examination of the violent consequences of segregation in the marketplace of ideas in new 
democracies. 
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H2.  Ceteris paribus, geographic regions with greater penetration of cellular transmission 
capabilities will experience higher rates of collective violence.   
 
 Moreover, this basic causal mechanism generates an additional observable 
implication.  If the effects of radio penetration and cellular penetration occur through their 
generation of divergent incentives for the production and dissemination of political ideas, 
then the processes through which such effects arise may be subject to a substantial degree of 
path dependence.  In this regard, the diverse historical legacies of African states provide a 
uniquely powerful laboratory for examining the effects of ICT penetration.  While most 
Western states experienced the introduction of radio infrastructure well before the 
introduction of cellular infrastructure, the order and timing of the introduction of these 
technologies has varied greatly across the African continent.  Given the mechanisms outlined 
above, it seems likely that the contemporary arrival of social communication technologies 
would carry very different implications in areas previously untouched by the stabilizing 
influence of mass communication technologies. That is, we should observe an interaction 
between their effects at the local level, in which the centrifugal forces generated by social 
communication technologies are weakened by the centripetal forces generated by mass 
communication technologies.  Hence, we should expect that: 
 
H3.  Ceteris paribus, the violence promoting effects of cellular technologies will be stronger 
in geographic regions with lower penetration of radio transmission capabilities.  
 
Estimating ICT penetration through optimized spatial interpolation 
 To test these hypotheses, I begin with geo-coded household surveys collected by the 
MEASURE Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Project (2012).  These data record the 
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ownership of radio receivers and cellular phones at the level of individual households, across 
24 African states, which were surveyed between 2005 and 2010.
 4
  Households are sampled 
in nationally-representative geographic clusters, with cluster centroids spaced throughout the 
populated territories of each country.  In total, the data record the characteristics of 286,299 
households in 11,556 geographic clusters. 
 To convert these measurements into usable covariates for statistical analysis, we 
require a means of accurately interpolating measurements across unequally-spaced survey 
cluster locations, allowing us to represent the data as a continuous surface.  Common 
approaches to this problem include inverse distance weighting, and various forms of non-
linear splines.  However, such techniques treat each measurement location as independent, 
and thus ignore the effects of spatial autocorrelation.  Here I employ an alternative, spatially-
explicit approach to interpolation, known by geographers as ‘kriging’, which directly models 
the spatial dependence between sample locations as a function of distance.  This allows the 
interpolation algorithm to explicitly incorporate information about the degree of spatial auto-
correlation present in the data when forming predictions about unsampled locations, greatly 
increasing the accuracy of the resulting estimates.  
The estimation procedure begins by specifying a decay function which parameterizes 
the relationship between the semivariance of the covariate sample (the average squared 
difference in measurement values), and the geographic distance between sample locations.  
This function, the empirical variogram, is fit using a Matern functional form (Stein, 1999). 
The key parameters governing the shape of the function , the range parameter ( ) and the 
smoothing parameter ( ), are fit using a Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm, seeking values 
which minimize the sum of squared errors. 
                                                 
4 The countries included are: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
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 These optimal parameter values are then used to estimate a continuous-surface 
representation of geographic variation in the variable of interest, through locally-weighted 
interpolation of the sample values – a procedure known as ‘ordinary kriging’ (Matheron, 
1963; Oliver & Webster, 1990; Cressie, 1993). The key parameter governing this process is 
the size of the interpolation neighborhood; that is, the number of sampled locations used to 
predict the estimated value at each unsampled location.  In principle, this could be the entire 
set of sampled locations, but in practice performance is generally optimized with local 
neighborhoods that include only some fraction of the available sample points.  In order to 
select optimal neighborhood sizes for each sample, I utilize a leave-one-out cross-validation 
procedure, which repeatedly generates the interpolated surface, iteratively excluding each 
sampled point from the estimation.  Residuals are calculated by comparing the measured 
value at each sampled location to the interpolated value estimated when that point was 
excluded from the estimation sample.  The optimal neighborhood size is then selected by 
utilizing a numeric search algorithm
5
 to find the parameter value which minimizes the mean 
squared prediction error (MSPE) of the cross-validation estimates. 
 Adapting this approach to the current problem, sample locations are defined by the 
centroid of each geographic survey cluster.  For each survey cluster location, the variable of 
interest is measured as the proportion of households within the cluster reporting access to a 
particular technology.  For instance, if a cluster contained 20 surveyed households, 5 of 
which reported ownership of a radio receiver, then that cluster's value for the radio variable 
would be 0.25.  For each location, locally interpolated values are estimated using the distance 
dependence parameters estimated from the full set of survey cluster locations, and 
neighborhood sizes optimized separately for each surveyed country, thereby allowing for 
differences in sampling or spacing between survey waves to be captured by the kriging 
                                                 
5 The search algorithm uses a combination of golden section search and successive parabolic interpolation, a solution known to converge 
relatively quickly even for functions which lack known derivatives (see the online appendix for details). 
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algorithm and incorporated into the resulting interpolated surface.  The values estimated for 
each country are then merged into a single continuous surface.  In this manner, interpolated 
surfaces are estimated for both forms of communication technology, generating our two main 
independent variables: Radio penetration and Cellular penetration.  In the same manner, I 
also generate estimates geographic variation in rates of Electrification, which is included as a 
control variable to account for the general effects of wealth and economic development.   
The resulting interpolated surfaces for both media penetration variables are displayed 
graphically in Figure 1.  The upper left panel shows the density of radio ownership in purple, 
with darker values indicating greater density.  The upper lower left panel shows the density 
of cell phone ownership in green, with darker values again indicating greater density.  
Finally, the right panel shows the relative density of the two technologies, with purple 
indicating greater local dominance of radio, and green indicating greater local dominance of 
cellular technologies.  As can clearly be seen, there is substantial variation across 
technologies in the geographic spread of communications infrastructures, both between 
countries and within countries.   
To get a better sense of the accuracy of these interpolated surfaces, I use the cross-
validation approach described above to assess the predictive performance of the kriging 
procedure, by estimating separate MSPEs for each country, and for each form of 
communication technology.  For comparison, I then perform the same cross-validation 
calculations using quadratic inverse distance weighted (IDW) interpolation, a procedure 
which incorporates distances, but not spatial autocorrelation.
6
  The results of this analysis are 
plotted in Figure 2.  Each dot represents the errors calculated for one variable in one country, 
with purple dots representing estimates of Radio penetration and green dots representing 
estimates of Cellular penetration.  Error values derived from the kriging interpolation are 
                                                 
6 Linear and cubic IDW functions were also tested, but were found to perform less well than the quadratic form. 
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given by vertical axis, while errors derived from the IDW interpolation are given by the 
horizontal axis.  The diagonal reference line marks the locations where dots would fall if the 
errors generated by the two procedures were equal, with dots below the line indicating 
smaller errors for the kriging approach.  The plot shows that the predictive accuracy of the 
kriging interpolation outperforms the IDW interpolation for every combination of country 
and communication technology, clearly demonstrating the advantages of incorporating 
detailed geostatistical information into our estimates of spatial covariates.   
 
Point Process Modeling of Violent Event Locations  
In the models presented below, the dependent variable is measured using UCDP's 
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED).  This database seeks to record the time and location of 
all events of collective violence in Africa which killed at least one person, and which arose in 
the context of an organized conflict which killed at least 25 people in a given calendar year, 
for the period from 1989 to 2010, recording 24,381 events in total.
7
   The goal is to use this 
information to examine the relationship between the spatial reach of communication 
infrastructures, and spatial variation in the production of collective violence.  
  In most recent work examining such questions in the quantitative literature on civil 
conflict, the underlying statistical approach has generally relied on the prior definition of 
spatial units of analysis, such as grid cells, settlement polygons, or political districts, which 
are then treated as separate observations in a spatial regression.  The fundamental difficulty 
faced by this approach is known by geographers as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem 
(MAUP).  Put briefly, this work shows that multivariate spatial regression estimates tend to 
be inherently unreliable, because they are dependent on the choice of the spatial units 
(Openshaw, 1984; Fotheringham & Wong, 1991).   Different spatial units can generate 
                                                 
7 This definition of the dependent variable combines events characterized by GED as anti-state violence, non-state violence, and one-sided 
violence against civilians, as the theoretical mechanisms proposed here appear likely to apply to all three forms.  See Sundberg, Lindgren & 
Padskocimaite (2010); Sundberg & Melander (2013).   
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different results, even when the underlying data remains the same, and these statistical biases 
exhibit widely varying directions and intensities.  Moreover, because each redefinition of the 
spatial resolution necessarily entails a redefinition of the units of analysis in the resulting 
regression, there is no principled way to select between competing specifications.   
To avoid such difficulties in examining the relationship between our measures of 
communication infrastructure and the location of violent events, I instead estimate covariate 
effects through the use of non-stationary, inhomogeneous, point process models.  In contrast 
to the spatial regression techniques currently in common use in the field of conflict studies, 
this approach avoids the need to specify arbitrary spatial units of analysis by simulating the 
emergence of point-like events in a continuous space, while also providing a convenient 
means for parameterizing patterns of spatial interdependence between events (Diggle, 2003; 
Baddeley &Turner, 2005).   
The point process modelling framework proceeds by treating each independent 
variable as a continuous spatial surface, and then simulates the emergence of point-like 
events within the space defined by these surfaces.  These simulated points function 
essentially as randomized control observations, forming a statistical backdrop against which 
we can compare the properties of actual events.  The algorithm proceeds, first, by recording 
the value of each independent variable at the location of each event observed within the 
‘dependent’ portion of a given spatial-temporal window.  Next, it records the values of the 
same independent variables at a set of 10,000 quadrature points, generated at randomly 
sampled locations across the observation window.  Statistical inference then proceeds by 
comparing the distributions of covariates observed at the locations of actual events, to the 
distributions that would have been observed if events had emerged randomly within this 
space (Baddeley &Turner, 2000).  Importantly, because the control locations are randomly 
sampled, they will be uncorrelated with the spatial characteristics of the data at all scales 
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simultaneously, and thus will not privilege any particular geographic scale when estimating 
covariate effects. 
 To conduct this analysis, I first define spatio-temporal observation windows for each 
model.  The spatial dimension of each window is constrained to locations within 40 
kilometers of a survey cluster, which represents the approximate reach of a medium-powered 
transmitter.  Robustness checks with alternative radii of 30 kilometers and 50 kilometers 
generated substantively equivalent results, and so are omitted here in the interest of space.  
Because the surveys underlying our key independent variables were collected in different 
years, I adopt two different approaches to the temporal dimension of the observation 
windows.  The goal in each case is to use information from the GED database to estimate 
covariate effects on the locations of violent events which follow the entry of survey collectors 
into an area, while simultaneously controlling for the effects of violent events which 
preceded their entry, in order to guard against the possibility of spurious results arising from 
reverse causation between violence and infrastructure.  In the first specification, I construct 
the windows using a common set of years, with the dependent variable measured for the 
years 2005-2010, and the control variable measured for the years 2000-2004.  In the second 
specification, I construct windows which vary by country based on the year of each survey 
wave, with the dependent variable measured for the period following each survey’s entry, and 
the control variable measured for the five years preceding each survey.  In each case, the 
dependent portion of the window is characterized by point-like events, while the control 
portion is characterized by a continuous density surface,  generated by Gaussian kernel 
smoothing (see the online appendix for details).   
To guard against spurious correlations, the models reported below also include a 
number of additional control variables, each treated as a separate continuous surface, and 
recorded at a grid resolution of 5 kilometer square cells.  To capture the effect of urban 
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environments, I include Urban extent as a dichotomous indicator, based on data from Global 
Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) which measures the location of 'built environments' 
through satellite imagery (CIESIN, 2011).    To capture the effects of cleavages between 
politically charged ethnic settlements, I rely on a newly geo-coded version of the Ethnic 
Power Relations dataset (Geo-EPR), which records the settlement locations and political 
status of all politically relevant ethnic groups living in geographically circumscribed regions 
(Wucherpfennig et al., 2011).  I code Ethnic inclusion as a dichotomous indicator, which 
equals 1 for all settlement locations of ethnic groups with representation in the executive 
branch of multi-ethnic governments.  Population density is measured using the UN's Gridded 
Population of the World (GPW) database (CIESIN, 2005) and  Elevation data is taken from 
the USGS GTOPO30 database (1996).  Lastly, Local wealth is measured using the 
purchasing power parity adjustment of gross cell product, from the G-Econ data set, which 
records gridded economic production data on global basis at a resolution of 1-degree 
latitude/longitude (Nordhaus, 2006; Nordhaus et al., 2006).   
 In addition, because our hypotheses are primarily concerned with sub-national 
variation in the reach of communications infrastructures, and because a number of  country-
level variables could conceivably be influencing our outcomes in unmeasured ways, all 
models are estimated with country-level fixed effects.  This approach ensures that the results 
reported below are driven entirely by within-country variation in the production of collective 
violence, while also ensuring that the results are not due to spurious correlations between 
communication infrastructures and any state-level factors.  
The point process modeling framework also provides a convenient means for 
parameterizing the spatial interdependence between events.  Failure to account for such 
interdependence in the causal processes generating our observed events can result in severely 
biased statistical estimates, as spatial correlations which arose due to influences between 
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neighboring events can instead be spuriously attributed to spatial covariates.  In the present 
specification, I account for this possible non-independence of events  by specifying a 
pairwise Strauss interaction function between points as a component of the simulated point 
process, which provides a flexible means of accounting for the possibility that events are 
more likely to arise in proximity to other events, within a specified interaction radius (Diggle 
et al., 1994; Waagepetersen, 2007; Strauss, 1975).
8
  Optimized coefficients and standard 
errors for  the parameters governing the strength of the inter-point influences and the 
influence of each additional independent variable are then jointly estimated from the data 
using maximum pseudolikelihood (Besag, 1975), selecting parameter values which allow the 
simulated point process events to most closely match the distribution of covariate values 
observed for the actual events. 
 
Results 
 Coefficients and standard errors derived from these models are reported in Table I.  
Model 1 is a baseline specification which includes only the control variables, using the 
‘common years’ approach to constructing the spatio-temporal observation window. Model 2 
adds the two media penetration variables to the baseline specification, and Model 3 then adds 
a multiplicative interaction term between the media penetration variables.  Model 4 repeats 
the specification of Mode 3, instead using the ‘survey years’ approach to construct the spatio-
temporal observation window.   
 The results from Models 2-4 are all strongly supportive of Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for Radio penetration (p < 0.001) indicates 
that geographic regions with greater levels of penetration by radio infrastructure, as captured 
by greater rates of household radio ownership, experience systematically fewer events of 
                                                 
8 All results reported below utilize an interaction radius of 900 kilometers.  Robustness checks with radii of 800 kilometers and 1,000 
kilometers generated substantively equivalent results, with slight decreases in overall model fit. 
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collective violence.  In contrast, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
Cellular penetration (p < 0.001) indicates that geographic regions with greater levels of 
penetration by cellular infrastructure experience systematically higher rates of collective 
violence.  In addition we can see that these effects are robust to the inclusion of controls for 
electrification, urbanization, local wealth, ethnic inclusion, and state-level fixed effects, 
indicating that they cannot be dismissed as mere artifacts of modernization or development.   
 Examining the results reported in Models 3 and 4, we also find strong support for 
Hypotheses 3.  The negative and statistically significant coefficient for Radio x Cell  (p < 
0.001) indicates that the violence inducing effects of Cellular penetration are greatest in 
regions characterized by low levels of Radio penetration.  This relationship can be more 
easily visualized by the plotting predicted intensity of violent events as a function of our two 
key independent variables, while holding all other variables constant at their means, as shown 
in Figure 3.  The central panel shows the predicted intensity of violent events – that is, the 
expected number of events per square kilometer – at different combinations of values of 
Radio penetration and Cellular penetration, with darker red colors indicating greater 
expected levels of collective violence.  The purple plot above the central panel shows a 
kernel density estimate (a smoothed histogram) of the values of Radio penetration observed 
within our estimation sample, while the green plot to the right of the central panel shows the 
observed values of Cellular penetration.  The plot makes clear that while Radio penetration 
generates pacifying effects under nearly all observed conditions, the effects of Cellular 
penetration are strongly conditioned by the local density of Radio penetration, with the 
greatest levels of violence observed in regions where the arrival of cellular technologies has 
occurred in the absence of prior penetration by radio infrastructure.  In contrast, in areas with 
strong penetration by radio infrastructure, the marginal effect of cellular technologies goes 
nearly to zero. 
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 Taken as a whole, these results thus lend strong credence to the predictions laid out in 
Hypotheses 1-3.  Moreover, it seems that this pattern of effects could also provide a partial 
explanation for the apparent divergence between existing empirical findings in the literature, 
which point to a positive association between cell phone coverage and violence in the African 
context (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013), but to a negative association between cell phone 
coverage and violence in the context of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq (Shapiro 
&Weidmann, 2014).  While both sets of authors argue that the observed effects are due to 
reductions in the ‘transaction costs’ of communication, the results presented here indicate that 
the key difference may lie in divergent historical legacies, which left much of Africa with 
weak penetration of mass media infrastructure (Livingston, 2011), but granted the denizens 
of Iraq nearly universal access to mass media technologies (Awad & Eaton, 2013).  If the 
theory presented above is correct, then the ideational forces generated by these divergent 
historical trajectories may help to explain how the same fundamental reduction in the costs of 
interpersonal communication could in one context facilitate divisive mobilization, but in the 
other facilitate collaboration with central authorities.  Such patterns thus highlight the 
complexity and context-dependence of technological effects, and hence the clear need for 
approaches which allow comparisons within countries, across countries, and across 
technologies.  They also further imply that the observed effects of new communication 
technologies are driven, not simply by their ability to solve ‘freeriding’ problems amongst 
would-be insurgents, but rather by their capacity to facilitate new lines of ideational cohesion 
and division.   
 Nevertheless, it could be objected that because the measurement of our dependent 
variable draws heavily on mass media reports, the observed correlation between social media 
and collective violence might have resulted from increases in the reporting of violence, rather 
than actual increases in violence.  However, it is important to note that the coding procedures 
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used in the GED project were designed to make extensive use of NGO reports, local 
newswires, and other secondary sources, in an attempt to mitigate such biases (Sundberg, 
Lindgren & Padskocimaite, 2010; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).  In addition, comparative 
evidence indicates that the GED database leads the field in providing coverage of events 
which occur even in remote, peripheral locations (Eck, 2012).  This potential criticism also is 
greatly weakened by the fact that the effects reported here have been shown to be robust to 
wide variety of controls for development and urbanization, which  should be strongly 
correlated with the conditions under which such reporting biases would be observed.  
Moreover, it seems difficult for such an account to explain the observed negative association 
between mass media and collective violence, as it seems unlikely that those infrastructures 
were associated with a reduction in the reporting of violent events. 
A more serious objection is raised by the possibility of reverse causation between 
violence and the presence of ICT infrastructure.  While the results were shown to be robust to 
the inclusion of controls for prior violence in the vicinity, in principle it is always possible 
that these controls have missed some historical process by which broader patterns of violence 
have conditioned the spread of ICT infrastructure, rather than ICT infrastructure conditioning 
the spread of violence.  To address this possibility, I make use of data derived from 
longitudinal surveys to capture variation over time in the spread of ICTs.  For most of the 
countries in our sample, surveys recording both forms of communication technology have 
only been conducted for a single year.  However, in Uganda we have access to repeated 
surveys, conducted in 2006 and 2011.  Utilizing the kriging approach described above, I 
estimate separate interpolated surfaces for each form of communication technology and for 
each year of survey collection.  I then define two new variables, Radio growth and Cellular 
growth, as the difference between the values observed in 2006 and the values observed in 
2011, for each form of communication technology.  Positive values on these variables thus 
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indicate increases in ICT penetration over time at a given location, while negative values 
indicate the destruction of existing ICT infrastructure.   
 To assess whether a relationship exists between the location of violent events and 
rates of ICT expansion, I then specify two separate point process models, using the same 
procedures described, with reduced observation windows that include only locations in 
Uganda within 30 kilometers of survey clusters in both years.  The first model seeks to 
predict the location of violent events observed in the years between the two surveys, using 
the initial values of Radio penetration and Cellular penetration.  The second model seeks to 
predict the same events using these variables in addition to Radio growth and Cellular 
growth.  The results are presented in Table II.  If the violent events which occurred within 
this temporal window did in fact condition the rates of change in ICT infrastructure, then the 
addition of these variables to the model should increase its ability to retrospectively predict 
the locations at which those events occurred.  In fact, coefficients for the growth variables are 
both far from statistical significance ( p = 0.481 and p = 0.399), and the results show no 
improvement in predictive capacity across the two models (actually a small decrease), as 
measured by the Akaike information criterion (AIC).  In other words, I find no evidence that 
the locations of contemporaneous violent events are systematically associated with 
subsequent increases or decreases in the strength of ICT infrastructure, indicating that the 
results reported in Table I are not likely to have been driven by reverse causation.   
 
Conclusion 
 The results presented here thus represent strong evidence that patterns of collective 
violence are powerfully influenced by technologies of communication.  Moreover, the results 
also indicate that different forms of communication technology can generate starkly divergent 
effects.  Mass communication technologies facilitate vertical linkages between state and 
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society, by increasing the ease with which centralized authorities can disseminate broad 
symbolic appeals to national unity.  That is, such technologies tend to increase the strength of 
economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas.  In contrast, social communication 
technologies facilitate horizontal linkages between the members of a society, which serve to 
heighten the relevance of socially-segregated communications, thereby decreasing the 
strength of economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas, and rendering easier the 
production of divisive mobilizational appeals and sectarian attachments.  As a result, radio 
infrastructures function to reduce the occurrence of collective violence, while cell phone 
infrastructures function to increase the occurrence of collective violence, especially in 
peripheral areas lacking prior access to mass media technologies.   
 Moreover, I have shown that these inferences are robust to controls for electrification, 
urbanization, wealth, and state-level fixed effects, and thus cannot be easily attributed to the 
broader effects of economic development or modernization.  In addition, analysis of 
longitudinal surveys from Uganda has indicated these results are not likely to have been 
driven by reverse causation, as there is no evidence that rates of ICT expansion are associated 
with the locations of contemporaneous violent events.  Rather, the evidence indicates that 
spatial differences in the reach of communication infrastructures have powerfully influenced 
processes of nation-station state formation, by altering the dynamics of ideational 
competition, and thereby altering the opportunities for the production of collective violence 
and collective peace.  In other words, the evidence demonstrates that the geography of 
collective violence is strongly conditioned by the geography of collective ideas.  
Consequently, attempts to understand and predict the emergence of collective violence will 
require careful attention, not only to the forces generated by physical coercion, but also to the 
forces generated by normative communication.    
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AIC   57891.86   57587.33   57543.86   35445.77 
 
Coefficients and standard errors derived from non-stationary, inhomogeneous point process 
models with pairwise inter-point interactions. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
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Figure 1. Radio and cellular penetration in Africa, c. 2005 
 
Interpolated values derived from kriging across 11,556 survey clusters.  The upper left panel 
shows radio ownership rates, with darker values of purple indicating greater levels of radio 
penetration.  The lower left panel shows cell phone ownership rates, with darker values of 
green indicating greater levels of cellular penetration.  The right panel shows the proportion 
of the local density represented by cell phones, relative to radios, with darker purple 
indicating greater dominance of radio, and darker green indicating greater dominance of cell 

































Figure 2.  Cross-validation of interpolation estimates 
 
Plot shows the MSPEs derived from cross-validation of surfaces estimated through optimized 
ordinary kriging and IDW interpolation. Each dot represents the errors associated with the 
surfaces derived for a particular technology in a particular country, with purple dots showing 
errors derived from estimates of Radio penetration and green dots showing the errors derived 
from estimates of Cellular penetration.  The diagonal reference line shows where the points 
would fall if the errors were equal between the two interpolation approaches, while points 

































Figure 3.   Predicted intensity of violent events: 
  Radio penetration vs. Cellular penetration 
 
Estimates derived from coefficients and standard errors from Model 3.  Central panel shows 
the predicted intensity of violent events (the expected number of violent events per square 
kilometer) at each combination of values of Radio penetration and Cellular penetration, with 
darker red colors indicating greater levels of collective violence, scaled logarithmically.  
Purple plot above the central panel shows a kernel density estimate of the values of Radio 
penetration observed within the estimation sample. Green plot to the right of the central panel 
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